Usenet History: Authentication and Norms

  • webmaster
  • 30 Jun 2021

Usenet is a computer-based international distributed discussion system. The particular Unix-to-Unix Copy (UUCP) dial-up network scaffolding was used to create it. This idea was devised by Tom Truscott and Jim Ellis in 1979, and the company was founded in 1980. At the time users could read and post messages (known as articles or postings and together referred to as news) to around one or more newsgroups. In many ways, Usenet is similar to a bulletin board system (BBS), and it was the forerunner of the commonly used Internet forums. These discussions were threaded, similar to the web forums and bulletin boards we see today, except that these posts were saved chronologically on the server.

Authentication & Security:                                     

Usenet was now in function. Well, what now? Truscott and his group were aware that it would need some sort of an administering system. This also meant that they soon realized that they lacked in the authentication arena as well. Truscott and his group needed an authentication system for sites, users, and even posts. Even though they were aware that they would need something like a public cryptic key to authenticate it, Truscott and his group weren’t aware of how a site’s public key could be authenticated.

They could’ve used a certificate issued by a certificate authority, but they didn’t know it at the time. Even if they had known, there was no way for them to get it done as there were no such authorities present at the moment. Also, they couldn’t simply create one themselves while also creating Usenet. Their knowledge in this subject ran very thin, and they had questions that they could not quite find answers to. For example, what exactly was secure, or what would be the ideal length of the key?

This shortcoming brought them to consider alternate options: What if their sites could authenticate each other in a peer-based authentication system? They considered the idea of this neighborhood authentication for a while but were ultimately met with failure because of loopholes in its logic. In order to spoof an authentication, a user had to simply fake its path line to claim to be a couple of neighboring sites away. This could potentially cause security concerns.

Security was quickly becoming a roadblock that kept them stagnant for a while. They realized that their approach to authentication had several loopholes in them, though anyone with the slightest knowledge of Usenet could get through.

To understand this flaw in the system, it is important to note that messages on Usenet were sent using a generic remote execution mechanism. This means that the site ran a command to read the next-in-line computer that had the ‘rnews’ command running. This is exactly what was concerning. If someone knew about this detail in the algorithm, they could easily just manipulate the neighbor’s key to get an authentication.

At the time, it wouldn’t have probably caused a big issue because the number of users was very low as the internet was only used by a handful of people. But making something that only gave off a perception of security instead of real security wouldn’t have been very ethical to do.


In principle, detecting misconduct and determining who perpetrated it will be simple. Like UNIX, the uucp system isn’t built to avoid excess consumption problems. Which uses of the internet are actually misuse, and what should be done regarding them, would be revealed via experiences.

Abuse of the internet may be quite dangerous. They may be talked about, sought for, and sometimes even coded against, just like conventional misdeeds, but only experiences can reveal what counts. Uucp gives a certain level of security. This operates as a regular user with stringent access restrictions. It is reasonable to argue that it does not offer a higher hazard than a call-in line. But the main issue was that they had no idea what to do or what other difficulties would arise. They were concerned about security to some level. They actually encountered their earliest hackers in 1971, when some behavior resulted in a console alert. This ordeal prompted them to inspect the punch cards for the code in question — but it was far from their major concern. They made a fast-and-easy password guesser and let a few individuals know that their passwords were terrible and could lead to potential hacking.

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